HOME | DD
tarleina β Struggling with Me
Published: 2007-05-25 03:30:34 +0000 UTC; Views: 267; Favourites: 0; Downloads: 3
Redirect to original
Description
There is a space in my soul that needs filled.I turn to God.
He replies, "As I told Paul, 'My grace is sufficient for you.'"
"But, Lord," I plead, "I need more."
"And you will have it, if you only believe."
So I wait. I wait with the hope of a dying woman.
And the space grows.
Just when I think I have found what will fill it.
I find that I was wrong.
My faith is weak and shaken.
I have read that we are made strong it weakness.
Where is my strength?
"Lord, I need you." I cry.
"You have me, my daughter."
There is comfort for a moment.
But I am weak and I have doubts.
In walks Satan, who tells me I have so much to fear.
The angel on my shoulder says, "Be at peace and fear not, God is with you."
I take courage and pray.
I feel grace pour through me.
Warm and safe, as if God himself had His arms around me.
The space starts to close.
It will not happen instantly.
Time and patience are His tools.
God has begun His work.
Related content
Comments: 61
Sweetie! I love ya! Your poems are always filled with such feeling, and it's true, if you believe, comfort and good things will come to you...in time.
π: 0 β©: 1
Yes, they will. God can do anything! I'm really lucky to have the faith I have. I've been through a lot and my faith has kept me sane so far.
Love ya, 
Mishi
π: 0 β©: 1
Only children need imaginary friends to make them feel better.
π: 0 β©: 1
Only adults recognise their own frailty.
π: 0 β©: 1
I saw "reply on Struggling with Me" and thought oh bugger, yet another person telling me to burn in hell. Thank you for proving me wrong. That said, I hardly feel frail.
π: 0 β©: 1
Maybe, (and I mean this in the best humour and will), you're still a child.
I just thought this poem was a little personal to receive such targetted criticism of beliefs.
π: 0 β©: 1
In some ways, perhaps, I am still childlike β I'm still full of joy at life, and I hope never to lose that β but I'm not innocent, I'm not dependent, I'm not gullible and I'm in control.
This poem seems to be about being utterly dependent on God. The narrator would surely do better to depend upon her own power. That was essentially my point.
If the poem were that personal she would not have published it on deviantART or at least disabled comments. We all accept criticism is part of the game.
π: 0 β©: 1
I believe that 'surely' is only true from one point of view (thanks, Obi-Wan), and it is perfectly possible to be deluded at any stage of life in any way. Some people like to share their emotions, even if that later proves foolish.
π: 0 β©: 1
I'm not criticising sharing such ideas and feelings. I'm merely voicing my own response. Or are people entitled to voice their opinions and have them go unchallenged? I don't think that's right. We challenge politics and philosophies and ideologies all the time; why should religious faith be untouchable? I think the most plausible reason for that is that many religions are paranoid that if they are questioned they will collapse.
And I think moral relativism, which I was always unhappy with, lost its last serious defender on 9/11, so you'll forgive my use of 'surely'. I'm doing a whole unit on Skepticism this semester and fancy I know a fair deal on the subject of certainty. Even from a theistic point of view, it's better to stand on one's own when possible. Ergo the saying "The LORD helps those who help themselves".
I cannot know there is no God. The only logically tenable position is agnosticism; the question has not been and probably never will be answered. I personally find it more likely to be the case, and the simpler explanation, that there is no God. At least not in the religious sense.
I acknowledge that my own atheism is as much a matter of faith as any religion, and I wouldn't dream of going out to convert anyone, although I will freely argue my point with anyone who advances his own. However, I find it enjoyable and rewarding to encourage everyone to question the things they accept (I had a most pleasant time playing devil's advocate to an atheist last week, helping her question her belief), for whether they may or may not change what they believe, they will have stronger reasons for belief.
π: 0 β©: 1
True - the expression and response are equally valid, but I wonder at the opinion of the artist, who may be feeling vulnerable.
I once offered artistic rather than ideological criticism on a piece of art that was highly personal and caused upset.
Incidentally, the saying is just a saying and one criticised by many theistic scriptures, such as the Old Testament (which covers the Ibrahimic faiths), not so sure on non-Ibrahimic.
π: 0 β©: 1
The way I see it, the reasons we put art on here are three: exposure, criticism and community. If you don't want criticism, like for example if you're feeling vulnerable, you turn off comments.
If the original author wants to challenge and debate with me I am more than happy to.
π: 0 β©: 1
I would suggest that not everything can be put to logic, as our logic is subsidiary to our psychological makeup, and thus debate on certain issues will achieve nothing, but I agree that comments perhaps should be disabled.
Nonetheless, I would also maintain that criticism should be of an artistic rather than philosophical nature.
And finally I would suggest that leaving comments on allows for supportive comments from friends.
π: 0 β©: 1
I would dismiss your suggestion with a snap of my fingers. Logic is subsidiary to no such thing! The laws of logic and mathematics exist entirely independently of the human mind and any "logic" which does not is not worthy of the name. It is true, however, that many people are not swayed by logic, and it's certainly not the only way in which people can or should think. Nevertheless, debate will only achieve nothing if one or both debaters do not consider thoroughly and sincerely the viewpoint of the other.
I hardly think it's your place or mine to disable comments or even say whether they should be disabled. If the deviant wanted to she still could and zap goes our enjoyable little debate.
It's a philosophical poem; you'll please forgive me for responding in kind. Or am I to be restricted to merely critiquing the rhythm and rhyme?
Re your last point: Of course it does; but we accept that it also allows for negative criticism, it's part of the deal of this deviantART. Personally I find negative criticism a lot more useful than positive, "I love it"-type comments, regardless of how much I might enjoy to receive the latter.
π: 0 β©: 1
To be contrary and to further the debate, which is more important than standpoints or ideas, how do you know that logic is independent of the human mind. Even without going as far as solipsism, empiricism demonstrates that the only experience we have is our own, everything constantly filtered into the understanding of our minds. Our reactions and methods of comprehension could be entirely defined by our psyche, the reasoning lying in the unconscious.
I don't see the poem as philosophical, but as an outpouring of personal emotion in which the spiritual side is almost incidental. Would you criticise (this question is as friendly as possible) a brink of suicide poem for excessive wavering of the character?
True, constructive criticism is useful, but I would still believe, (and I know our positions are unlikely to change, as we are both stubborn) that that applies to artistic methodology and manner of expression.
π: 0 β©: 1
I've been doing two subjects on this matter over the last semester: one on RenΓ© Descartes and the other on formal Logic itself, and I fancy I've learned a great deal on the subject of Logic and Knowledge:
Logic is the cousin of Mathematics; the only intrinsic difference is that Mathematics is quantitative, dealing with numbers, and Logic is qualitative.
Mathematics exists independently of the human mind; the laws of Physics were around long before we were, and it seems absurd to posit that the laws of other forms of Mathematics and Logic are not also inherently true.
That the only experience we have is our own is trivial and tautologous; but Logic has squat to do with human experience. We have an intuitive grasp of it; "advances" in the field are generally only better ways of expressing it, like Calculus was a better way of expressing how functions worked. Now, I consider the point proven, but if you insist on bringing up objections I would be only too glad to shoot them down.
I don't see the poem as overtly philosophical, nevertheless the spiritual element is central and spirituality is very closely related to and overlaps significantly with philosophy. Call mine a spiritual criticism, then.
If I felt that the wavering detracted from the piece, I probably would criticise it - however I don't think it would detract in the first place, and would probably add to the poem. There are exceptions, of course; Fade to Black is powerful because it is resolute, but you don't feel much empathy for the character. A suicide song wherein the character is wrestling with himself can be most effective. It's an interesting question, but I don't see the relevance.
Criticism applies to what is expressed as well as its manner. We analyse literature for the motivations of its characters and the intentions of the author, do we not?
π: 0 β©: 1
I'm enjoying this debate, so let's continue, if you're happy to.
If you've studied Descartes, then you will know of the malignant demon. And yet Descartes acknowledges one thing he can be sure of - the Cogito. What can expand his knowledge to? Nothing, because everything else is subsequent on facts, some form of data, all of which is coming falsely from the malignant demon. Can he form a system of patterns, sequences, causation? Surely not, because his experiences are controlled by a force beyond his control. Enter our cognitive processes.
Additionally, for logic to be intuitive and entirely independent of experience it must be present from birth - that is to say that it is caused by nature. If it is dependent on nature, it is inherited, and inheritance never occurs perfectly - there will be those born without logic. Surely that cannot be said to be the case.
What other experience do we have? How do we acquire said experience?
And finally, the point of physics and mathematics. There is a choice - they either exist genuinely objectively, or they are constructs of the mind. How do we prove the natural laws? By testing them, that is to say, we input experiential data, which is dependent on ourselves. How do we state them? With algebra, with numbers, with alphabets, with modes of expression each conceived and created by humanity and thus inevitably subjective. David Hume, an important philosopher in the field of Logic and Reason, used the example of a billiards table. One appears to hit one ball into another, and the movements are caused by you hitting the ball which hits the other ball. However, because you are only human, you are unable to perceive the system of magnets which has in fact moved the ball. It is humanocentric arrogance to suggest we can know the universe in sufficient detail to be sure that the cause-effect chains we have perceived are correct.
π: 0 β©: 1
Descartes begins the Meditations with the skeptical arguments in order to refute them. The cogito is the Archimedean rock with which he is able to lever the world. Initially, yes, he can't know anything except for the cogito, but he is able over the course of the Meditations to recover much more knowledge. He dismisses the malignant demon quite early on in the piece.
Our experience of logic is intuitive; logic itself is not. It's painfully obvious that many people aren't able to use logic properly at all, and even the best logicians occasionally slip up. The same goes for mathematics and physics. Take a game of cricket, or baseball if you like. I hit the ball in your direction. Now, you can look at it and figure out I hit it at a certain instant, a certain angle, a certain velocity, and you can sit down with a pen and paper and plug these figures into your equations and about a week after the ball has whizzed by your left ear you're able to say where you need to be and when in order to catch it. Or you can look at it and say "There's a ball coming β catch it!" and let your intuitions do the work, observe the accelerations caused by wind and gravity on the ball, extrapolate its future position intuitively, and catch me out. Now you might miss the ball, if you miscalculated wrong mentally, but you accept that. Someone might make a logical error - whether he's using a formal logical language or not is immaterial - but he should be receptive to correction. More so in fact, because once you've missed the ball it doesn't matter to correct you, but a logical error might still be having effects.
Granted our symbols and logical languages are human and imperfect, and so are our approximations of some of the laws of physics, but the logic and mathematics on which those laws are based are not approximations. As I said in my last post, advances are in ways of expression, not new logical rules themselves.
There is no such choice at all! Physics is in a way both, because our constructs aren't complete and there are still mysteries to uncover. Mathematics is less so, and is essentially objective. I discount Hume's allegory as a violation of the law of best explanation. If we were to discover the magnets it would be a different story, but the only reason the model might be true in the first place was if the magnets were the means by which such cause and effect took place, in which case we would still be right!
Logic isn't about cause and effect, however, and nor is mathematics. Both may describe instances of cause and effect, but such words are not native to them.
π: 0 β©: 1
Okay, then to spin this in another direction, what is the use of logic, when what it cannot explain what is subjective. One Philosopher of Mind (I forget whom), told the story of the woman who lived in a black and white room for all of her life, but read textbooks and understood scientifically the concept of colour. However, if she left the room and experienced colour as a subjective qualia, she would be understanding it for the first time - all that had gone before was immaterial in explaining.
My point is that either logic is not absolute, and so open to bias, and so not of use objectively, or that it is an absolute, and in being so is too abstract to apply to human experience. To relate it to mathematics - either maths is an imperfect human way of understanding the concept of two stones, or the concept of two is meaningless without those two stones to provide a subjective basis.
π: 0 β©: 1
There's a third way. There is indeed a difference between intellectual understanding and experience. I defy you to disprove any logical tenet, or even to show that it might not be the case, using whatever techniques you wish. You can only even attempt this by recourse to another form of logic. There is no "metalogic" to which to appeal. And any such attempt will be a failure. The idea of something being too absolute to apply to experience seems illogical to me (again, I apply logic β I can't get away from it!), because if that was the case then why would we have discovered it in the first place? But we use logic all the time, in this very discussion of course both you and I are following it, though informally. Being imperfect ourselves, there is always the danger we may make mistakes, and indeed we all do, some more often or more dangerously than others. But if everyone accepts that fact, as we philosophers do, and is willing to admit to such a mistake, and if everyone is taught to question and be logical, then we can trust ourselves to apply logic correctly in the long run.
To refer to "two" as a concept is odd, as there would continue to be pairs of things even if there were nobody to have such a concept. The languages of mathematics, like those of logic, are indeed imperfect, but the things they describe are absolute. I am thus, in a way, taking both your models and weaving them into a complete picture.
π: 0 β©: 1
You believe that pairs of things endure beyond the concept of two, but does the concept of two (mathematics) endure beyond the pairs of things (substance, subjective reality)?
It is nice to meet an enquiring philosophical mind.
As for metalogic - I would call it cognitive psychology.
π: 0 β©: 1
That definition of metalogic only applies if logic is a mere human (or to avoid speciesism, intellectual) construct, which I feel I have established and will continue to argue is a false assumption. It cannot be used the way my hypothesised metalogic, whose existence is impossible, was supposed to be used.
I regard that pairs of things endure even when nobody has the word "two" to be self-evident; there were binary stars and dividing amΕbΓ¦ and and even if there were no universe and nobody to have such a concept, there would be the possibility of two. For this I invoke the existence of the Universe itself, whose existence rests solely on its being possible. The Big Bang was the result of the Universe "quantum-tunneling" into existence, which is essentially a tiny change in something's state from possible to actual, and happens all the time. Electrons and atomic nuclei are merely fields of probability, and when we observe them they tunnel into a specific position. Strictly speaking, "tunneling" normally refers to finding something in an unexpected, although possible, position, but the difference between this and a quantum taking a certain position on observation is merely one of degree. The universe was possible, and the universe contains every number up to a very large amount if you can be bothered to count different things (and it still contains that number if you can't be bothered to count them, nobody would deny that), and since those numbers are intrinsically not different from larger numbers or zero, and since subtraction also occurs in the universe they are not fundamentally different from the negative numbers or from zero. There are now models which explain the universe in terms of time measured with imaginary or complex numbers, which are also in any case a natural extrapolation from real numbers and functions.
If the universe was possible, and the universe contains numbers and mathematical operations, then these numbers and operations are possible while the universe itself is still just a possibility, and indeed they are just as real without it. If there were a parallel universe with completely different laws, there could not be one in which two and two make five, nor one without subtraction or calculus, nor one in which there is no notion of causes and effects, however random events may be, and however different the physical constants and laws might be.
It is a pleasure debating with you.
π: 0 β©: 1
More fun than actually revising for my philosophy A-level anyway.
I really struggle to think of anything but 'everything you just wrote comes from flawed perceptions. It may just be an illusion. '
But of course, an illusion is a description of the possible. But what defines possibility? A.J. Ayer discovered verification, and Anthony Flew falsification - the preconditions by which something can be considered possible, meaningful, knowable - can we, objectively, using clear a priori rather than clouded a posteriori knowlege, prove the universe does exist? Or that it doesn't? What source is sufficiently reliable to provide us with adequate evidence for or against? And if none exist, then the very concept is meaningless.
As regards the universe, Hume (the ultimate 'but actually, no' fellow) points out the Fallacy of Composition - we consider a group of apples, all of which are red. But we cannot identify them as a Red Group of Apples, only as a Group of Red Apples. In the same way, to group is only a human psychological reflex, a Determination of Mind, and so to generalise from the constituent parts of the universe to the universe to the universe itself is false; furthermore, to generalise from the universe to universal ideas and rules (mathematics) is false too - how can something be universally true, given that some science suggests the constituent reality is relative. (General and Special relativity apply to space-time. Why cannot there be a relatively of mathematics, which therefore renders it useless?)
And why must anything contain reason? Bertrand Russell suggests that everything simply is, and to go any further is to begin making mistakes of reasoning, and so philosophy in itself is useless, an intriguing distraction. He points out that we are never objective. Aristotle, even when describing ultimate reality is distorted by his cultural and upper-class perspectives.
π: 0 β©: 1
Hehe yeah, I have an exam on Descartes on Wednesday and one on Logic next week, and I was up 'til all hours last night finishing my Logic assignment.
We have to be careful, certainly - but if you're going to argue that logic and reason or mathematics are not absolute then that is an absurdity, for in arguing you are applying the laws of logic (from which mathematics is inseparable). And to suggest it is all just an illusion might be valid, had I not gone through everything I believed from just such a skeptical point of view, begun with the cogito and essentially constructed an agnostic variant on Descartes' refutation of skepticism, in which I replaced his fallacious proof of the existence of God with proofs of the existence of logic and mathematics. I defy you to show me any possible working system where the laws of logic and mathematics are not precisely as they are.
To generalise from the constituent parts of the Universe is logically fallacious, but so far in science it has mostly worked, and there is no other way of figuring out how the rest of the Universe operates. Logic however is not a constituent part of any universe, it is an abstract thing far higher than mere matter. Ditto for space and time (relativity) versus mathematics.
Russell has reasons for saying everything simply is. Science can't go much better β we can see almost to the Big Bang, but the reason for the Bang itself we put down to mere probability, an unsatisfying reason but a reason nonetheless. Russell is also right in saying that we are never objective, which is why it's so deathly important that we question and debate all that we believe, and are receptive to criticism and correction. Which is why, in turn, religion is an anomaly, because for whatever cause it has made itself resistant to such criticism and correction, and the only reason I can think of for this is that it simply wouldn't stand up to it.
I'll make an extended quote here from a speech by Douglas Adams, a well-known atheist philosopher (though more well-known as a comedy writer): "Now, the invention of the scientific method and science is, I'm sure we'll all agree, the most powerful intellectual idea, the most powerful framework for thinking and investigating and understanding and challenging the world around us that there is, and that it rests on the premise that any idea is there to be attacked and if it withstands the attack then it lives to fight another day and if it doesn't withstand the attack then down it goes. Religion doesn't seem to work like that; it has certain ideas at the heart of it which we call sacred or holy or whatever. That's an idea we're so familiar with, whether we subscribe to it or not, that it's kind of odd to think what it actually means, because really what it means is 'Here is an idea or a notion that you're not allowed to say anything bad about; you're just not. Why not? - because you're not!' If somebody votes for a party that you don't agree with, you're free to argue about it as much as you like; everybody will have an argument but nobody feels aggrieved by it. If somebody thinks taxes should go up or down you are free to have an argument about it, but on the other hand if somebody says 'I mustn't move a light switch on a Saturday', you say, 'Fine, I respect that'. The odd thing is, even as I am saying that I am thinking 'Is there an Orthodox Jew here who is going to be offended by the fact that I just said that?' but I wouldn't have thought 'Maybe there's somebody from the left wing or somebody from the right wing or somebody who subscribes to this view or the other in economics' when I was making the other points. I just think 'Fine, we have different opinions'. But, the moment I say something that has something to do with somebody's (I'm going to stick my neck out here and say irrational) beliefs, then we all become terribly protective and terribly defensive and say 'No, we don't attack that; that's an irrational belief but no, we respect it'." You can read the full transcription of the speech at this [link] and I strongly recommend you do; it's most entertaining and exceedingly clever.
And this has brought us full circle back to the original topic of our debate: the problem of faith. It's completely irrational, and the only way you (by you I here mean you, ~marvintheparanoid) can defend it is to deny rationality itself, which by definition is an indefensible position. Faith can be harmless but it is a waste, and it can lead to things that are decidedly not harmless.
π: 0 β©: 1
But one need not defend faith. It is simply a choice upon which differing opinions based on wide-scale life choices, (and I might add varying degrees of inspiration), depend.
It reminds of the Black Swan argument - tell someone before the discovery of Australia using every rational reason that there are black swans, the drawings, the anatomy, whatever, and they will not believe. If they experience one for themselves, then they will believe.
Of course, our experience might be fallacious, but that is for us to judge. The intercession of others is impossible, because they cannot share our subjective perspective: For example, look at this thread and the complete lack of debate, because everyone is on the same side: [link] The people have their subjective self-verification 'This is who I am', which is akin to faith. There will always be stalemates in arguments when the matter of proof is absent (Studying philosophy of religion, you get back and forth - Anselm to Gaunilo to Descartes to Kant to Malcolm to Finley on just the ontological argument, and no argument prevails, because it is not a matter of proof). Only choice provides an answer, and only an individual can make a choice.
Irrationality, because it is a key component of humanity (at least in my eyes) can never be said to be automatically wrong, because to suggest the line between rationality and irrationality is the line between right and wrong is incorrect - Kierkegaard points out that, as a human, to be subsumed into perfect rationality and logic destroys the irrational elements of humanity like emotion and spontaneity.
π: 0 β©: 1
The Black Swan argument, it seems to me, goes thus. Before the discovery of Australia and our black swans, the Europeans were right to believe there were no such birds. One could describe a black swan in great detain, or draw a picture of it, and people would understand easily what was meant by the expression black swan. They would be wrong to deny that such an animal could possibly exist. Yet it was as foolish to believe that they actually existed as it was to believe the "Here be dragons" at the edges of their maps, because there was no evidence for either. New evidence arrived, in the form of actual black swans, on the discovery of Australia. Of course, some people would refuse to believe even after this - most still had not seen one, and there were sometimes hoaxers about making up animals - but it was more plausible, if the specimens were examined and shown to be real by independent investigators, to believe that there were real black swans in the world. It was always a mistake to believe there were no black swans, but it was still the right thing to believe while there was no evidence of them. It was only a reprehensible mistake after the evidence was presented.
If I were presented with evidence, of a similar level of credibility, of the existence of God, would I stick to my atheism? Of course not; I would readily admit that I had been mistaken. I cannot be sure there is no God; I merely find it the best explanation.
"But one need not defend faith." Why are you continuing to do so then? You see, that's exactly what Adams is arguing against. A religious idea is a hypothesis about the universe like any other, and is just as deserving of skeptical analysis. I have no objection to religion if it's practised by consenting adults in the privacy of their own homes; or debated honestly and openly just like any other idea, which is of course what we're up to here. Of course it's not a matter of proof; that's why the only tenable position is agnosticism. Unlike Richard Dawkins, my purpose in challenging faith is only to get people to think, not to gain converts.
Whether our ideas are fallacious or not, they ought to be challenged, and we ought to be responsive to such challenges by defending our ideas. Such debates go on all the time, as Adams points out, in every field except religion. Why? Because most of them won't stand up to such criticism, so they have evolved to be extremely paranoid of it; I give the Muhammad cartoons as an example in our times, and many more can be found. In some parts of the world we are moving toward the more sensible attitude; in others, we are moving backwards. Thankfully in my country, most people are moving forward, and while we have a reputation for tolerance, that tolerance is based on the twin concepts that any idea is up for defending and attacking, and that an attack on an idea is not an attack on the person who happens to hold it. Most Australians are agnostics, and indeed don't understand what all the fuss is about, particularly in America. Church attendance here is approximately 5%.
In many parts of America, both religious tolerance and criticism of religion are at best stagnant. I also recently read about a proposed law in Britain outlawing such criticism, and was stunned and dismayed; I don't know whether the law has been enacted or not. The point is that religious discrimination is being equated to racial discrimination, whereas it is in fact more akin to discrimination on political grounds, for this simple reason: We are not defined, as persons, by what traits we are born with. Rather, we are defined by our choices. Religion is not inborn; it is a matter of choice, and while religious or political discrimination is wrong in some contexts, it is the correct choice in others. If a school has a uniform requirement, it is not obliged to waive it for daughters of Muslim parents who want to wear the hijab. It might be very nice of the school to do so, but in that case it would be bound, if it were to be consistent, to allow all other forms of ideological expression and indeed any equally free choice of clothing.
Our environment is a big influence on these choices, and many children choose or are obliged to follow the religion of their parents β which is why I argue that religious indoctrination, initiation or instruction of children is unethical and indeed repulsive, for clearly most of them don't bother to make their own decisions. To quote from the second-most successful piece of Christian propaganda (after the Malleus Maleficarum): "Why don't they teach them logic at these schools?!"
I am an emotional, spontaneous, spiritual, and irrational human being and proud of it. The fact that I use logic and skepticism wherever possible does not destroy that aspect of my being. However, when it comes to the field of ideas, logic should prevail.
π: 0 β©: 1
Oh the law has been enacted in Britain, but it was altered by the gloriously non-democratic House of Lords that only deliberate incitement to violence is illegal - so 'Let's get a minigun and mow down members of x religion.' (With thanks to Nick Griffin, head of the BNP for that example).
When does the influence of our environment end and free will begin? When are people free of the influence of their upbringing? It can be argued that everything than happens to us is indoctrination - conditioning us, altering our thought patterns, and so, as I was arguing before, we have no objective point of view that is not seen through the lens of all that experience - we will never freely be able to choose whether to believe or not.
Where does the field of ideas end? Don't our paradigms shape our whole life (especially as regards faith/worldviews)?
In Britain, with the legacy of the Enlightenment, rational discussion of religion is far more accepted, with hosts of philosophers discussing it and its nature, and coming to varied conclusions, so nothing is immune from question. But every question can be questioned, and so no shatterblows are ever scored.
π: 0 β©: 1
Ah. Well that's good, we don't want intolerant gits like that. I'd say the same of people who wanted communists/greenies/conservatives shot. On the other hand, it goes right to the highest level in America, where George Bush Senior doesn't want atheists to count as citizens.
The boundary between environmental influence and free will is different for different individuals, but we all have complete free will. This is not a contradiction, for the following reason. Someone like me, who questions the faith of his fathers and formulates his own worldview, has definitely transcended the boundary. Someone who lets his environment shape him (generally because he's too lazy, unambitious or unintelligent) is just as responsible for what he says, does and thinks, because he chooses to be shaped.
Which is why education is the key: the sort of education which forces us to think for ourselves, rather than telling us what to think. Teaching children the facts of science and history is all to the good, but just as these and mathematics and English are compulsory in schools, so should critical thinking, philosophy and logic. An example of a huge step in the right direction is the International Baccalaureate (IB) certificate, which has for its core compulsory subject "Theory of Knowledge". I wish my school had offered the IB. What is most important is to teach the children to question every proposition and argument they come across (including that proposition itself).
My reasons for believing in free will are only as strong as my reasons for disbelieving in God β convincing evidence and best explanation, not definitive proof β but I will explain them to you if you like.
The very notion of an "objective point of view" is of course to an extent fallacious, as you seem to appreciate; but that doesn't mean it's not desirable, and rational debate is the best way to get as close to it as we can. This can be the story for my second Moral without a story.
Where does the field of ideas end? Where the field of actions begins. It's only when an action is actually immoral that ideas enter into it, and most actions are morally OK. Otherwise, do as ye will. Yes, our worldview shapes our lifestyle; but unless your religion is telling you to kill people (which only a few do) or indoctrinate your children (which most do) or such things, then it's your own private business. If it leads you to do evil things, then you must be stopped, but of course the part of it not related to the evil things you're perfectly entitled to retain. If you openly profess it, you must be willing to accept criticism (but not hate), as is the way with any other idea.
If every question can be questioned, then only the strongest questions will survive; it's not a never-ending cycle as you seem to assume. This is, I suppose, an evolutionary understanding of the nature of ideas. Evolution applies to everything: it is the most powerful of all statements, because it is self-evident in a way that few propositions are (to my mind, the cogito is one of the few that even comes close), yet it is the cause of so many things: That which survives, survives.
π: 0 β©: 1
I suppose the Hegelian process accounts for the non-stagnation of ideas as well, but I can't help but wonder whether the chain of synthesis will eventually end up at the original thesis again.
I agree that logic and philosophy would be a very good idea in schools (Britain wants philosophy in primary schools), but I note that at least the British education system barely teaches half to read and write in twelve years - I can't imagine them being able to critically think, so some other change must proceed that.
I don't believe that we can choose whether or not to be shaped, because it requires cognition from the beginning - as a very young child I was crafted by external rather than internal influences, so when I finally developed a consciousness, I was already using patterns of thought I had garnered from the world (and from those who had taught me, the indoctrination of children being inevitable as parents, though I suppose morality consists in what is indoctrinated).
To strive for perfection is very good, especially that of true objectivity, which is surely growing close to omniscience, and if it is possible to create and understand a concept of perfection - perhaps Anselm serves here - the being, that above which, no higher being can be conceived.
Is a thought an idea or an action? A thought can be immoral - where we mentally judge or degrade someone, and it shapes our later thoughts and actions. The boundary between ideas and actions is hard to define because they are interactive - they will impact on each other in the future.
I like Moral Without a Story II, because it is a clever concept, but is it hopeless to fight for perfection when we cannot reach it?
π: 0 β©: 1
"I can't help but wonder whether the chain of synthesis will eventually end up at the original thesis again." It won't. If it did, that would only be because it was right for it to do so. But we can derive many many things once we start from first principles with the cogito, and they will not lead us back to the skeptical hypothesis.
I'm not saying there isn't a huge amount of work to be done β but of course just because something is difficult is no reason not to do it. Indeed, even if something is demonstrably impossible doesn't mean it shouldn't be attempted.
If you're a theist and you deny free will, then all the evil in the world is God's fault. How do you explain this?
Is a thought an idea or an action. That's a very good question indeed. Let's suppose an idea is a kind of thought. A datum, a singular item of knowledge, is also a kind of thought. An emotion is another kind; a memory is another kind (or perhaps it's a subset of knowledge); an intention is another. I would argue that people should express their thoughts, but they have a right to not do so if they prefer. Ideas lead to intentions, which I think it's arguable do have a moral dimension to them. An intention can be good or evil, because it is directly and causally related to the corresponding actions β I would say people can also have morally neutral intentions, which are as acceptable as good ones but not specifically commendable. An idea, meanwhile, can be right or wrong, which is a subtle distinction from good and evil; there's also no middle ground, unless you want to say that parts of an idea are right and parts are wrong, but in this terminology I class these parts as separate ideas. Right ideas coupled with correct data can lead only to nonevil actions, whereas other combinations can produce evil actions as well. Of course, not all wrong ideas or incorrect data will lead to evil actions β the vast majority won't β but the possibility is not there otherwise. Hence the education argument.
The above paragraph was composed on-the-fly, I hadn't considered that particular model at all ever before, and it's 1am here in the real world so forgive me if it's less than clear.
I never said anything about fighting for perfection. We should work for it. It's what gives most of our lives meaning. And even if it is hopeless, is it not more hopeless to not work for perfection? Thanks for saying you liked the piece.
π: 0 β©: 1
A pleasure - it's the type of incidental, pithy work that makes you think further than its non-verbose length.
And I suppose it is hopeless not to work for perfection, but I would add the dimension that only the hope of perfection possible, a more theistic and non-proof faith based understanding, comes from the intervention of the genuine perfection.
I don't know how I feel about free will - Paul, a pretty good example of a theist, states how he wants to do something, but does not, and he hates to do something, but he does it - which seems far from free will - as if free will exists but is essentially bound or compromised in some way. I believe we are strongly influenced, and so intentions are more important than actions - its the hating of the immoral action, not the abstaining from it which is morality.
As for ideas and actions/intentions - if an action is neither good or bad, it is in a category where good/bad do not apply, and I believe non-provable ideas lie in the equivalent category of 'right or wrong do not apply here'
We can derive many things from the cogito, but are they correct? It seems this argument will ever go back and forth, and so surely must belong in the category of 'right or wrong do not apply here' - say the standpoint of mitigated scepticism - in the field of thought, it is acceptable to consider the possibility that our senses are wrong, but when crossing a road, regardless of whether anything in the situation exists, it is a sensible idea to trust your perception, lest your delusions take a new form - the simulation of death.
π: 0 β©: 1
If the cogito is correct, then anything we infer from it logically, validly and soundly will be equally correct, if perhaps less blindingly obvious. And I certainly agree with your crossing-the-road example. I don't think there need be a real perfection for us to strive for it β that was the original meaning of my little poem of course β but if it helps you and is harmless then it does come under the heading of "right or wrong do not apply here". Most things are amoral. "It's the hating of the immoral action, not the abstaining from it"... Well-put. And on the whole, I would agree with you. I'd say the abstaining is desirable, naturally, whether or not the perpetrator understands his actions. Again, it comes down to education. I believe we are created good to begin with (contrast this with the doctrine of Original Sin β and they call atheists pessimists! 
For my own part, I'm a definite believer in free will; I can't remember if I've shown you my argument for it and I am in quite a hurry this morning so I can't go and check the previous comments, but if I haven't and you'd like me to then I will in my next post.
π: 0 β©: 2
That emoticon is a misplaced ). I refute all emoticons.
π: 0 β©: 0
I think you alluded to the free will thing but were very tired.
A quick pre-question - what about neurological findings that suggest we make a decision 1/2 a second before we are consciously aware of it? What does free will consist in? I would like to believe in it, but I also believe in the power of great influences on us.
Self-actualisation is good; strangely, humanism (as in Rogers, Maslow - psychological humanism) makes me argue more against free will - the reason people do 'immoral' things, whatever they may consist in, is because they have been starved of their basic needs. Why else would the poorer people commit the greater number of crimes? When genuine equality (as in Marx, but perhaps more successfully in the early church - 'they shared all they had'
π: 0 β©: 1
In the first place, and I know you're probably not making this mistake, but crime cannot be equated with immorality. In past times many things we take for granted as morally acceptable - freedoms of religion, sexual orientation, association, speech, et cetera - were criminal ideas. If you're starved of your basic needs (as opposed to what the humanists called "meta needs"), and you can gain them without depriving others of the same needs, but through means usually thought improper or immoral, you are certainly less culpable (perhaps not at all culpable) for taking "criminal" steps. If someone is deliberately depriving you of such needs, you've an even clearer right to take them from him. However, you still need to do as little "wrong" as practically possible, preferably no more than is necessary. In an ideal world, those lacking the basic needs would need only to ask for them.
The usual way I present my argument for free will is as follows: Quantum mechanics gives us many examples of uncaused events. You can assume God steps in and guides them, or you can take the opposite view and cite them as evidence that the beginning of the Universe, taking place as it did on the quantum level, does not of logical necessity imply a Creator; that's tangential. Our science tells us that these little events are not only practically unpredictable, they are actually so β there is no way, even in theory, by which we can predict their outcomes. Most of the time, when we apply probability theory, we are using it to approximate the real world. Given a die, and all its physical properties as well as those of every medium with which it interacts, and its velocity and rate and direction of spin, and it is possible to predict with near-certainty which side it will show when it lands. Practically, this is completely academic, as we throw the die and don't bother to measure and predict: we wait and see the outcome. The point is that probability is only an approximation here. By contrast: at the quantum level, there is no way to take something apart, analyse its every property, and predict its outcome. The best we can do is do what we usually do with the die: calculate the probability of any given outcome. These quantum events are truly random and unpredictable. But we can predict their cumulative effects, because there is a known probability factor governing the effects which averages out over many instances. In the case of quantum events, there are so many of them and they are so small that until a century ago we took the effects of these probabilitistic events as rigid natural laws. Then Einstein and others came along and let the cat out of the box where it had been safely kept, not knowing whether 'twas living or dead.
Let us attempt to apply this analogy to human behaviour. We can certainly predict humans' behaviour very approximately; we can also talk about how societies evolve and behave. We can talk about motivations and how relationships work and what drives us to do things. But we can't do this with scientific certainty. Much as it would like to be, most of psychology (except for neurology) is not scientific at all. There's no shame in that; it's still useful. Human behaviour is, while understandable, nonetheless unpredictable. But nobody would argue that our behaviour is random, that it is merely the result of a set of probabilitistic equations which tend to produce certain behaviours. It is this paradox, unpredictability and nonrandomness, that allows for free will.
There are three possible explanations for this paradox. The first explanation I consider is that our behaviour is indeed random, but of the sort that deludes us into thinking that it is not. I would dismiss this with a wave of my cogito: we can't be deluded into thinking that we don't think. The second explanation is that our behaviour is in fact predictable, we just haven't figured out how. Current scientific theory offers no such means of prediction, nor does it readily suggest a way of finding one, but the possibility is not ruled out. I'm not sure whether the cogito, or a variation thereon, rules this option out too or not. The third explanation is that what we observe is all there is to the picture: our thoughts are unpredictable but nonrandom, and this is what we call "free will" β we are not constrained in our behaviour (although practically we want to make the choices that are best for self-preservation, pride, and so on, we are not constrained by absolute rules), we have a genuine choice. I accept that it may one day be discovered that our free will is an illusion, and that we are in fact governed by rules. But I see no reason to jump the gun and assume that this is the case, and I invoke Occam's razor for I believe I have demonstrated that free will is the simpler explanation. My reasons for believing in free will are no stronger than those for being an atheist or accepting the laws of physics, and weaker than those for accepting the notion of evolution, the scientific method, or the cogito, which among other propositions I regard as incontrovertible; nevertheless I stick by them until I am shown otherwise.
I haven't worked through the second explanation as thoroughly as I would like to yet: it may yet allow itself to be refuted by the cogito, but I'm not entirely certain of it. If I do manage to prove it, then my belief in free will shall have moved up to the highest level of certainty; given that the debate has raged for millennia and not been resolved one way or another, I don't like my chances, but that's not going to stop me from trying. Even if I fail, my argument above from simplest explanation still holds.
π: 0 β©: 1
Ockham's Razor is surely still just an assumption - does it really apply objectively to science? I would favour the second explanation along with free will - as a theist accepting both free will and that God knows precisely what we will do - and as a psychologist suggesting a theory known as eliminative materialism - eventually, but not now, psychology and neurology will account for mind and will, but not necessarily in a deterministic way.
I'm still unsure (but don't know enough physics) about quantum - previously, we could not predict the life cycle of stars, but now, with knowledge we can - can't the amassing of knowledge lead to a prediction of quantum behaviour?
π: 0 β©: 1
Occam's Razor can't lead to proof, but it is still useful. It's much more useful in science than in other fields of philosophy. For Descartes, who is only interested in what is absolutely certain, the Razor is useless. I cannot be sure that God doesn't exist, but it's the simpler explanation. (I also think it fits the observable facts better, but then most theists believe in non-observable facts, which to science is a contradiction in terms.) If you can't show (at present or at all) whether any of two competing theories is the best one, then you pick the simpler one. I find the free-will explanation much simpler than the hidden-determinism one. I accept that new facts may find it otherwise (although I personally think it very unlikely), but as I said, "I see no reason to jump the gun and assume that this is the case".
It is possible to be a theist, believing in an omniscient God, and still believe in free will; some have contended that this is a contradiction but it's not. (There are much more glaring contradictions in the world of theism for such thinkers to wrestle with.) I assume you're familiar with "soft determinism", which is a model I don't rule out out-of-hand. However, this model demands that God exists in a completely separate temporal dimension and can't have anything to do with us other than creating the Universe; and it also demands that we can never know the way the mind works, because there isn't one, because it is free. However, the second explanation I advanced does not allow for free will: it is a hard-deterministic mechanistic model, in which we are mere biological machines, our brains like computers running complex but completely definable software.
And as regards the quantum analogy: no β I tried to explain this above, clearly I failed. Take for example radioactive decay. You have two nuclei, say of uranium-227 with its convenient half-life of around a minute. You come back after a minute. Chances are, you find one nucleus remaining and one decayed, into whatever U-227 decays into. There was no way to know which nucleus of the pair was going to decay. But you might come back and find neither nucleus decayed, or that they both decayed. It's all a matter of probability.
The difference from other probabilitistic matters is that the two nuclei are absolutely identical. The quarks that make up the hadrons, and the hadrons and gluons that make up the nucleus, are identical in number and nature. The forces acting on them are also identical in our little experiment. There is no hidden mechanism in there which determines which atom will decay first, or when. It's not only that we can't see such a mechanism β rather, we can know that it's not there. Radioactive decay, and other probabilitistic quantum events, are actually, rather than apparently, unpredictable and random.
π: 0 β©: 1
What if the decision of which is better of two is determined by subjective concerns - personal experience, meaning, potential consequences. Some see Nietzsche as the inevitable consequence of Darwin, so does that suggest that without the ability to see into the past and see what exactly happened to bring about species (modern evolutionists believe it to be long periods of stability followed by massive evolution rather than the slow selection of Darwinism, but they can't identify what causes the evolution) that we should reject it because of the risks? To see what is simpler/better is very difficult.
I agree that free will/omniscience is possible, as there's a clear difference between knowing and causing. But can hard determinism truly exclude choice? For example, if you make a machine that can tell what is red and what is blue and turn a red light on if it is red and a blue light on if it is blue, then it is making a form of decision. If you amplify the complexity, a hard-deterministic person is presented with life, and based on their experiences and other preset factors, they respond accordingly. They are choosing what to do, but the machine is sufficiently complex as to be intelligent - weighing and judging, considering self, utilising near-infinite factors so as to be for all intents and purposes unpredictable.
I am sceptical about our scientific capability of understanding particles - we can theorise on distant observation, but we do not know that the two nucleuses are identical. A similar issue arose with the genome - two identical sets of genes can lead to different characteristics - clones were not the same as the master genetic code. The scientists eventually found epigenes, tiny extra details on the surface of genes the creation of which they could not explain, but altered the expression of the larger genes. What is to say that such factors do not exist in particles? The problem is, there can surely never be a non-subdividable fundamental particle, and so the intricacies of deepening particular levels could mark the difference between one quark and another.
π: 0 β©: 1
If the decision of which is the better explanation is subjective, that's bad science. Bad science is what gives us intelligent design, parapsychology, and many other bad ideas. Good science is dispassionate and analytical. The simplest explanation is the one which invokes the fewest unknown variables and equations, or if you prefer, the fewest unknown entities and interactions. The free will explanation invokes one unknown: the assumption that free will is the cause of the apparent paradox of nonrandom yet unpredictable behaviour. The deterministic explanation invokes several; it indeed posits an entire set of rules and equations, more in number and greater in complexity by far than any that exist in any other realm of science (or else we would have found them already); another unknown is how we find these rules and variables in the first place. Similarly, atheism invokes one assumption: that because we can't detect God in any way, he doesn't exist. Even if we were mistaken, and he actually did exist, we can detect no influence of him on anything so he may as well not exist. Theism claims he does exist, despite our not being able to detect his existence or influence on anything, he still does, and it usually claims many properties of this hypothetical being to be true, despite having no more evidence of them than of God's existence in the first place.
Of course hard determinism doesn't exclude choice, it merely says choices aren't free. Which is the crux of the problem for the theistic hard determinist, because God knows all our choices and created us, he created us knowing we would make those choices, ergo the choices are his responsibility, ergo if we do bad things it's his fault.
As regards the quantum theory, I'll concede that it is perhaps an appeal to best explanation, but best explanation is scientifically valid until it's contradicted by observed facts. There is no way we could observe a hidden mechanism that secretly generates the apparent randomness of quantum events, no theory that shows how one might be divined, so for all intents and purposes the events are truly random. On the other hand, we can observe the means by which our own unpredictable behaviour is driven, and it is decidedly nonrandom. Yet it is still unpredictable, even in theory. It's the best argument for free will I ever heard.
π: 0 β©: 1
Is it therefore the failing of people that they are intuitively discomforted by scientific explanations? Does a mother want to hear the evolutionary psychological reasons why she is attached to her child, or does she accept the 'immediate empricism' of love? Perhaps there is something to be said to accepting such thoughts 'as is', in which case there is a dual program for understanding - what we observe and analyse, science, and what we simply observe because it provides intrinsic justification, emotion.
In this case, then any final conclusion on questions such as God requires individual emotional response.
The influence of religious experience/illogical alteration of choice categories - the reformed who have 'found God' (Paris Hilton far far aside) - serves to some extent as the hallmark of God.
And teleology, especially regarding the natural laws and their necessity for life, poses an interesting simplest explanation question - do we, having observed that the oxygen resonance, strong and weak nuclear forces, electromagnetism, gravity and antimatter-matter ratios are perfectly tuned for human life, which any half-decent physicist can agree to and choose to believe in an undetectable creator or an undetectable set of universes where it did not turn out 'just right'. Either is as implausible as the other.
It comes down, a little ironically, to our free choice.
π: 0 β©: 1
It's no failing to be a little discomforted by the truth. To refuse to accept said truth because it's uncomfortable, however, is a sad failure.
I don't know about "immediate empiricism", but I agree love is far more complex than psychology can ever describe. I'd go so far as to say that insofar as I believe in anything remotely resembling God, I believe in Love. But Love didn't create the Universe, it didn't write or inspire any holy books, it is not itself sentient, and it doesn't want worship; it needs only to be felt. Science can tell us to a limited extent why we feel empathy; but our emotionality can't be reduced to variables and equations. Neither science nor logic can touch it, but we accept that it's there because we feel it. The definition you give of "emotion", however, ain't like any I ever heard. It sounds a lot like a good definition of "intuition", which is something entirely other but which seems to be more like what you're talking about. Intuition is a good starting point, and sometimes it's all we've got, but on its own it's neither proof nor evidence of anything. That many of us intuitively feel that the Earth is flat or that there is a God is no indication of the truthfulness of those propositions, merely that they serve some purpose. It makes more sense to act as though the Earth is flat in many cases; it's a lot simpler and when you're dealing with small areas the curvature of the surface is negligible. Similarly, in some cases, religion is a positive and useful thing, which is presumably why the intuition evolved in the first place. In our current world, however, belief in God does far more harm than good. It leads some people to do good deeds, but I'd wager 99% of those people would have been charitable with or without their religion. It leads other people to commit monstrous, evil acts; you cannot deny that. In the middle ground, we have the millions or billions of people who waste their time β whether it be an hour a week or an entire lifetime β time that could be better spent improving their lives and their world.
The question of God requires a rational response, not an emotional one, because it is an empirical question: "Does God Exist?" β you can answer such a question with "maybe", but not "yes and no", which is what an emotional or intuitive approach will give us. Emotional responses never lead to "final conclusion"s, because they are always, of their very nature, utterly subjective. God couldn't choose to exist for all the people who believe in him and not exist for all the people who don't. The rational response is that it's so unlikely that God could exist, and even if he did he has no influence on the world, so there's no point in believing. As I've already said, religion is in almost every case a waste, and in a small number of cases it's terribly dangerous.
Regarding the teleological argument, there's no need to believe in either an undetectable creator or an undetectable set of sister universes. Personally, I believe in neither, for as you said, there isn't a shred of evidence for them and they can have no effect on us or our world. There are some models of the universe that predict the existence of such parallel universes; if those models became accepted scientific theory, rigorously tested and making known and falsifiable predictions, I would accept them. If it were scientifically shown, or demonstrated to my own eyes, that God did or probably did exist, I would accept that too. But as things stand, we don't need either explanation. We can observe that the Universe is just right for us. After all, if it weren't, we wouldn't be here; although it's conceivable that a different sentience might evolve to fit the parameters of such an alternative universe, and it might well ask itself, "why does the Universe fit us perfectly?" The answer of course is that if the Universe were incapable of sustaining intelligence, then we would not exist. The fact that we are here is all we need; if something is true, it logically follows that that something is possible. I grant you, the combination of properties that allows for our existence is exceedingly improbable, but suppose you had a six-sided die. Better yet, some means of generating a truly random number between, say, one and ten billion. Suppose this process gave you the number 42. It was a one in ten billion chance. But after the event, the random generation, all bets are off. It's not necessary to assume that someone tampered with the process and made it output 42. Neither is it necessary to assume that the universe split into ten billion parallel universes and that in this universe you observe the number 42 and in every other universe a parallel you is observing a different number. The latter is a useful model for explaining how probability works, but it would be a mistake to infer from this model that that's the way it actually happens. You can say that it was improbable that the machine would output 42; you can't discredit the output just because it was improbable, because once something actually happens, it leaves the realm of probability altogether and becomes a fact.
The existence and nature of the Universe seems most improbable indeed. But that doesn't mean we need to invent ways to make it more probable, because the existence of the Universe is an observable fact, and probability doesn't enter into it. The question "why is the Universe here?" is in fact meaningless. This may be one of the uncomfortable truths we've mentioned before. We've had to learn to live with many such truths in the past; just because they are uncomfortable is no reason to reject them, although it's the reason many do. "How did the Universe come to be?" is not meaningless, and it is answerable by the quantum-tunneling model of the Big Bang. There's no need to assume anything more.
Teleological arguments also lead one dangerously close to the "Intelligent Design" travesty, so I have particularly little time for them. In fact, the only type of argument I have less respect for is the ontological one.
π: 0 β©: 1
Ah, but that's because ontology is genuinely stupid (and probably meant as a statement of faith rather than an argument).
I have always liked the idea of eschatological verification - that we can only find certain answers at a set endpoint - the height of human understanding, or death, or the afterlife, and any attempts to establish rational responses to such answers is fruitless purely because the juncture remains ahead of them.
The use of religion often depends to the adherence to it. The most dangerous people are the least religious whilst remaining within that category - an Islamic fundamentalist doesn't understand their Koran, and George W. 'God told me to invade Iraq' Bush can barely read, let alone have read things like, say, the Gospels. If people were serious about God, faith and religion, it would be far less dangerous, and far more useful.
As for intelligent design vs. evolution, science can't discount or support either (see [link] for details.) You have a good point on teleology, but in that case why are scientists so mystified by the miniscule probability?
Thinking of such thoughts, what about radical atheists like Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens? Do they do more harm than good, considering their often lack of good science and logic in their anti-religious work? Furthermore, is the danger manifested in so-called dangerous religious people the same danger manifested in any dangerous ideologists (Communism, Fascism), who once again fail to adhere to the beliefs they claim to hold (Marx believed in democracy, freedom, many things the Soviets didn't come close to)?
π: 0 β©: 2
On second thoughts, a simpler explanation may admit itself for the problem of "transitional forms": they exist, but we have no real way of denoting them. Our classification system dates from Linnaeus, who predated Darwin by a century and who like his contemporaries assumed that species were definable and unchanging. We adapted the system to refer to extinct species, including those only known from fossils. A species isn't actually a "thing" as such, but a category, a collection of things, defined as a group of individuals which can interbreed and produce fertile offspring. Genera and higher classifications don't even have a definition; they're essentially arbitrary groupings of smaller groups, and only a few are shown unambiguously to have descended from a common ancestor. Of the forms we see today, we could say they're all "transitional" forms, because nothing is completely static. The reason we don't see the transition in progress is of course because it is so slow. And this is where the definition of "species" falls down. We define a species as a group which can interbreed with itself, but animals of one generation cannot interbreed with the animals of a certain number of generations before, because they're dead. This also suggests a problem with species, because they seem to be able to overlap. Animals of generation 1 can interbreed (theoretically) with those of generation 3. Those of generation 3 can interbreed with those of generation 5. But 1 and 5 can never interbreed, because by the time the animals in 5 are fertile, all the animals in 1 are dead. We can see this happening in space as well as across time: the Crimson Rosella, Adelaide (orange) Rosella and Yellow Rosella are all native birds in my part of the world; each type of rosella's territory overlaps the other two. Initially they were classed as separate species, but it was discovered that the Adelaide Roselle interbred with the other two forms, leading them to be reclassified as subspecies of one species β despite the fact that the Crimson and Yellow varieties do not and cannot directly interbreed and would, were it not for the existence of the Adelaide form, be by all accounts separate species. Viewing this as an analogy of evolution across time, species gradually change, and even when a species at time A is clearly different from its later form at time C, they may both be said to be identical with the form at the intermediate time B. We arbitrarily delineate species A from species C, giving the illusion when we later read our work that there was a sudden rather than a gradual change. This is a much simpler and more elegant explanation (and probably a more mainstream one) than my above hypothesis, which I therefore discard.
π: 0 β©: 1
At which point, having suggested that change is slow, and gradual, comes an argument from a C. Darwin.
He states that the fundamental basis of evolution is gradual development of unique features, but adds that if anything exists that cannot exist realistically in anything but complete form, then it cannot have developed gradually.
Funnily, such things exist.
They include eyes (angle of refraction demands perfect consistency of cells), whales, (a bear-like ancestor must be able to live completely as a whale; you can't really have a finned bear or a whale with fur, new research suggesting brains, numerous others.
I know this is a side issue, but its one of the reasons why I like teleology as an argument so much.
π: 0 β©: 1
A side issue? In a debate as unstructured as this one, there are no side issues, lol. And while I agree that many of the changes that arise are very improbable, they're no more improbable with gradual rather than sudden change, because unless they arose over a single generation then we'd still have "incomplete" forms. But what's the point in saying it can't have happened gradually, when the fossil record clearly demonstrates otherwise? Indeed, in the case of eyes, light-sensing organs have developed independently multiple times in different evolutionary lines. As eyes give a huge advantage to species possessing them, any step in the direction of vision and then of better vision would be heavily favoured by evolution; but we must be careful not to infer from this the notion that evolution has a goal. Evolution doesn't strive for the best solution to a problem; it will try any solution, and the only test is that the individual survives to reproduce.
And, no matter how improbable such changes are (the independent evolution of eyes seems to refute the idea that they're all that improbable), they're far more likely and a far better explanation than their arising by design. Design also begs the question: who designed the designer?
π: 0 β©: 1
Which of course demands the causal argument, which suggests unless some infinite looping of time precluded by entropy, a first '
π: 0 β©: 0
Re ontology, I completely agree, although at least some who adopted ontological ideas intended to use them to persuade others.
Re eschatological verification, this goes back to what I was saying a while before, about perfection being impossible but no less desirable for that. Maybe there are some things we never will understand; to go all Socratic about it, the more we find out, the more we realise we don't know. But just because we can't find the answers doesn't mean we shouldn't ask the questions, much less accept unproven and unprovable hypotheses on faith.
Re adherence, here, fundamentalists take God, faith and religion most seriously, hence the tag "fundamentalist", whether Christian, Islamist or even atheist for that matter. Whether their particular brand of religion is consistent with the moderate, original or majority form matters nothing. Islamic fundamentalism is at odds with the Qur'an: almost definitely. I can't say for certain because I haven't read it, although fundamentalism is certainly incompatible with the brand of Islam practised by the few Muslims I know well. Bush's crusades are inconsistent with most Christian sects: a thousand times yes. However, this doesn't make them any less religious, and it certainly doesn't make them any less dogmatic and dangerous. I'll come back to this point as I'm answering you one paragraph at a time.
Intelligent design vs. evolution: Current evolutionary theory, it is true, leaves many questions unanswered, but it's a mistake to assume that it therefore must be wrong. Classical physics, for example, is woefully incomplete and is only an approximation of the actual workings of the Universe, but it was good enough for centuries and we still use it today, a hundred years into the quantum age, because it's simpler and accurate enough for most of our needs. The clearest answer to Patterson's question is this: "That which survives, survives." A logical tautology. Not a scientific theory, not a practical observation, but something far truer. The remainder of evolutionary theory is indeed that: a theory, nothing more. Quantum physics is no more than a theory, but it's a darn useful one and you wouldn't deny it just because it wasn't proven or it didn't explain everything. Come to that, Darwinian evolution explains that which it does explain much better than the I.D. idea; we can explain the lack of "pre-cursors in the Cambrian Explosion" by supposing that maybe we just haven't found the fossils yet, even assuming that they still exist. As for the transitional forms, I'm no biologist but I might propose an explanation that invokes no additional variables. Species generally evolve to better fit their environment; natural selection ensures this. The chance that a mutation will alter a characteristic of a species in one direction is as great as the chance that a similar mutation will alter the same characteristic in the opposite direction. In the long run, such mutations cancel each other out. Natural selection weeds out the mutations that would actually be harmful to the species. But when a species' environment changes, it is no longer perfectly adapted to it and it evolves, over many generations, into a form that once again strikes an equilibrium with its surroundings. In this model, evolution is always progressing but normally very slowly and in various directions which overall add up to very little change, a sort of "background" level; but when a mutation helps a species, then it leads to a much quicker rate of change. Still very slow, of course, but enough to account for the diversity we observe. I haven't really thought this model through clearly yet, and I've expressed it less clearly in turn than it is in my head, but it appeals to my sense of intuition (which is usually a good start) and it might just explain the jumps we observe.
I'm afraid I don't understand the question "why are scientists so mystified by the miniscule probability?" β I don't think they are at all.
Re your last paragraph: I haven't read Hitchens, but of what I have read of Dawkins (which isn't much) his main fault is not logical or scientific error but his abrasive, antagonistic tone. I think he is definitely tending towards the fundamentalist end of the spectrum, which is not a good place to be; as you rightly point out, fundamentalist atheistic doctrines such as the Nazi regime can be just as dangerous as fundamentalist religious ones. It's the twins of doctrine and dogma β unquestionable doctrine and dogma β which are the real evils. Failure to adhere to the beliefs one claims to hold is either hypocrisy or deliberate propaganda, a subject I am writing an album on, Doublethink, several songs from which are on my account here. I don't advocate an atheistic society, nor an agnostic one, for even agnosticism is an expressed view on God. I am in favour of secularism, and of the question of God's existence not even being asked, much less answered by anything other than rational inquiry; however, I respect people's individual rights, and religion, practised by consenting adults in the privacy of their own homes, is mostly harmless. I'm not claiming belief in God is an evil, merely a mistake. It is no crime to make an honest mistake.
π: 0 β©: 1
It would be interesting to see in a secular (by your definition) society if the question of God would arise spontaneously, that the concept is one we grasp once again intuitively.
An album sounds interesting - what genre? I'm currently writing a novel on the trade-off between truth and utopia - is it better to have a utopia built on a lie or chaos stemming from truth?
The interesting universal component of religion is the desire to share - the personal relationship of Christianity, the detailed truth of Islam, the path of life of Buddhism, each has a part where telling others, bringing them to the possibility of the same experiences, which means that the co-existence of 'consenting adults in the privacy of their own homes' and the religions that presently exist are mutually incompatible (I find myself reminded, bleakly, of Hizb Ut-Tahrir, who say democracy and Islam are incompatible).
π: 0 β©: 1
The question clearly arose to begin with; Adams explains how this could have happened in his essay. Early man is a maker of tools and an orderer of his world; he looks at his world and assumes somebody made it too, and wonders who. He's the only thing he knows that makes things, so he assumes that the maker of the world is a bigger, more powerful one of him (usually, many such beings). He furthermore assumes that, since the world fits him rather well, it was made for him; the notion that he was made to fit the pre-existing world doesn't occur to him, because as far as he can remember the world has always had him in it. It's an easy mistake to make, and as the other explanation available to him is "the world is just here and that's all there is to it" it's not a mistake that carries any blame. However, for the last several centuries at least we've had explanations found for most of the things we couldn't explain and although we've uncovered more mysteries along the way we've also had a sure-fire method of solving them; all we need is the time and expertise to apply it. God is not needed, and to invoke him to fill in the gaps in our knowledge is to invoke a steadily shrinking God. A secular society, which one assumes all societies began as, will probably beget a religion of one sort or another so long as it has no science. A secular society with the use of the scientific method will probably not develop a religion, and the few individuals inclined to cultish behaviour will be merely ridiculed. (I argue that the religions that have arisen since the rise of science have done so because of the permissive environment and the fact that they're no sillier than established religions.) It would be a most fascinating experiment to see if this is indeed the case.
Doublethink is progressive rock at the core, tending toward heavy metal on several tracks, traditional rock and roll on some and piano-pop on a few. That sounds like a fascinating novel; I'd argue that there's no contest, a truthful world is better than a utopian one. I also believe that in a world of complete truth, a form of utopia will arise eventually, whereas in a utopia built on lies, the truth will come out but will probably destroy the utopia in the process. But that's probably just the optimist in me.
I wouldn't call the desire to "share" (speaking euphemistically) universal among religions. The Jews do not proselytise; nor do the Buddhists or the neo-pagans. I would agree that many of the religions that we have would have to adapt in order to be legal in this ideal society, and that many would refuse to. Democracy certainly appears to be incompatible with some forms of Islam, but it's also just as incompatible with similar forms of Christianity; it's just that said forms of Christianity have mostly disappeared. It's high time Islam did the same; I have Muslim friends who are living proof that Islam can be good and moral and compatible with democracy. The trouble is that there are many forms of it that aren't. A related issue is democracy itself: it generally doesn't work, but with education it would work better and with the application of modern communications technology it would work better still; I'm planning a story on this concept, The Division Bell (strangely enough, not named for the Pink Floyd album of that name), exploring the feasibility of direct democracy by electronic means in a society of millions.
As the muggles say, "truth will out" β but we have to help it and it's no help if the views of outdated superstitions are given credence on important issues.
π: 0 β©: 1
Having seen that film on Thursday, I got the reference:
The Division Bell sound fascinating (and don't dismiss the album as an influence); perhaps you should ask your Muslim friends their opinion of Sharia and its relationship to God and society.
Interestingly, I would also argue there was no contest between utopia and truth, but I believe utopia. That is the intent of the novel, to divide opinion, to make people think about it (including the distracting fulcrum issue of asexuality as a principle of the utopia).
π: 0 β©: 1
| Next =>