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Description

The nation of China may be united on a map, but it contains such diversity that visitors could be forgiven for thinking it was a vast variety of different countries. From ancient divisions (e.g. the ancient rice-wheat divide), to the modern ones (e.g. the infamous Red Border), each province and city of China has its unique cultural influences.

This map depicts the two nations and one region which use Han languages as a primary language: China, Manchuria and the Formosa (Taiwan) region of Japan.

In the first map, the modern political situation is shown, as well as the vast cities of the region (and neighbouring states). A divide is obvious - the Megalopoleis of the Pearl and Yangtzi river deltas, the evenly spaced cities of the North China Plain, the coast-hugging cities of the Southern coast, the cluster of cities in the Sichuan basin, and the scattering of cities through the relatively rural interior.

Despite the seemingly drastic divide between the busy Yangtzi delta and the spread out North China Plain, this difference mostly stems from the devastation of the Second Civil War and the Oriental War, when rival tank armies battled for control the plains and nuclear weapons were first tested on Chinese military-industrial centres. This wartime devastation began a divergence which, combined with the post-war political tension, a divide in political-economic systems, and the differing dependences on railroads and ports for trade, led to the concentrated development of Southern port cities, while Russian economic dominance led to the concentration of growth in Northern regional railroad centres.

The relative density of the Sichuan basin in the West has always been the case, thanks to its fertile plain, but wartime migration and the relatively looser western border between Russian and French zones certainly helped.

Manchuria's cities feel more natural to the Western eye - a scattering of cities small and large, thanks to ports (Yingkoe and Dairen), railways (Moukdun and Kharbin), resources (Heseiki and Kitsurin), or politics (Changchuen).

The second map depicts the political situation in the immediate aftermath of the Oriental War. During the planning for the rapidly approaching defeat of the Bellist/Futurist/衝者 (Chungje) government, neither the Russian or Japanese governments were willing to agree to give up the foothold they had gained in the world's largest market - not even to the legitimate restored emperor. Despite French pleas to agree to a neutral 'Open China' policy, the final peace treaty established zones of occupation. Russian forces advanced to occupy the lions share of the country north of the Yangtzi; Japan kept Chingdao and gained Nantong and most of China south of the Yangtzi; while France added the leftover portion - Guaijoe and parts of the former Guangshi/Guangdong provinces - to its trade post of "Joeshan and the Argent Isles" and its pre-war protectorates of Yunnan, Hainan and the Shoung state. The restored Imperial Chinese government was left only with Nanjing and its hinterlands, and the "Red Border" stretched from Sichuan to Shanghai.

The legacy of these occupying powers continues to deeply affect the provinces which are heirs of the systems they estabished. Most clearly on the map, Yunnan, Hainan, the Shoung state and Joeshan remain autonomous countries - practically independent in all ways except military, thanks to the French withdrawal conditions with China (and, less openly, Japan, which effectively took France's place throughout its East Asian sphere of influence soon after).

Less obviously, the cultures and economies of North and South have been deeply affected by each occupier - and not just through the uses of Cyrillic and Juyin in writing.

The Russian government, deeply influenced by/interested in/invested in its domestic corporations, decided the best way to cement its influence without infringing on the de jure sovereignty of the Chinese government was to sell the huge amounts of seemingly abandoned productive capital to its own corporations. Paired with the physical embodiment of its influence, the Russian gauge railroads that soon grew like vines southwards to the Yangtzi, the Russian government determinedly made North China an economic vassal of the Russian Empire, consuming Russian imports while selling Russia cheap goods and resources - a completion of what Russia's China policy had sought to achieve for a century.

In contrast, the Japanese occupiers saw how Russia posed a greater military threat than ever before, as well as the opportunity posed by the home-grown resistance networks in Southern China, which had formed in opposition to the Chungje regime's aggressive centralising/modernising/homogenising policies. These resistance groups, mainly organised by old provinces, were allergic to the Futurist ideology they saw reflected in the Russian government's Rationalism (which dominated Western governments at the time), and looked towards the left-wing Japanese government of the day, and its message of Asian solidarity, as a way to protect the traditional cultures they had grown protective of (a passion for traditional culture today seen in the formal Hanfu and Qipao, the popularity of traditional sports, and the vigorous practice of traditional spiritualism). Provincial boundaries were redrawn with the help of a few effortlessly staged referenda, creating new states centred around the various Southern Han languages (which, not coincidentally, put wealthy Japanese-occupied areas along the Red Border into new provinces under complete Japanese influence). These states survive today, along with their local cultures and identities - fiercely proud of their local dialects, and protective of their freedoms from centralised power.

In order to draw a contrast to Russian policies in their battle for Chinese minds, the Japanese drew a leaf from the book of European Distributists, in extolling the virtues of local power and property. The positive legacy of Japanese land reforms were drawn upon by the left-wing government of the day, which distributed Chinese property mostly to local farmers and peasants (although urban industrial capital tended to go to the legal successors of the pre-war Caifa conglomerates, which, not coincidentally, had become heavily tied to Japanese zaibatsu through loans and share ownership). The Southern states operated on constitutions that granted solid rights to citizens, as well as significant autonomy to municipalities. The economic influence of the Japanese, who emphasised naval power and sea trade, is also evident in the size and influence of port cities.

This north-south divide has only increased as China has reunified, and internal migration across the Red Border has opened up - Northern migrants choosing to move to Southern commercial cities has enhanced the economic divide, while causing cultural tensions to rise to new heights despite the first truly independent and united Chinese governments since before the Oriental War.

The third map shows the traditional areas of ethnic and linguistic 'minority' groups. Four distinct types of group are visible.

First, there are the ethnic minorities. In the northwest there are the few Mongols who were not detached to join independent Mongolia after the war, the Tibetans in the border regions which Tibet was forced to give up due to the sheer size of the neighbouring provinces (and the overweening influence of Russia), the Muslim Hui scattered across Northern cities, and various other minor border groups. The southwest features a plethora of Himalayan and other mountain groups - so numerous they justify the existence of the two exceptionally autonomous states of Yunnan and the Shoung state. On the island of Taiwan, a diverse group of Austronesian aborigines live in the mountains, isolated from the tightly packed coastal cities dominated by Japanese-speaking Han people. In Manchuria, state support has ensured the flourishing of the culturally central Manchu people, as well as the Ewenqi, Oroqen, and Daur.

The second group are the migrant communities - the Russians, Joreans and Japanese, none of which have any significant presence outside transient urban communities in China itself. The Russians form a significant presence in the cities and agricultural plains near the Russian border, and along the railway line which cuts through Manchuria past Harbin to Vladivostok. The Japanese are more focused in southern Manchuria, with the exception of the Japanese-developed oil city of Heseiki in the north. The Japanese language has an outsized influence in Manchuria compared to the size of the Japanese ethnic group, thanks to the heavy influence of Japanese media, companies and products across the country. Japanese people are also, obviously, present all across Formosa, though particularly so in the developed coastal plain. Koreans are different to these more urban immigrant groups - Korean migrants arrived in such great numbers through the 19th and 20th centuries that great swathes of eastern Manchuria are primarily Korean-speaking, with Hangul taking pride of place on street signs and advertisements.

The third group make up the Southern Han language groups. As mentioned previously, these dialects form the basis for the post-war new states, and are jealously guarded - the Wu language (based on the Sujoe standard) by Wuyoueh, the Min language(s) by Minyoueh and Chaoshan, the Youe language by Guangnan, the Hakka language by Nanling, the Gan language by Ganpo, and (to a weaker degree) the Shiang language by Shiangchu. The Huey and Pinghua are the closest to Mandarin, some still debating whether they are really just dialects of Mandarin, but speakers of each have strong localist identities, identifying as independent languages within their respective states.

The fourth group are the 'Quasi-Mandarin' groups - groups of dialects which don't quite fit in with Mandarin but aren't different enough to warrant identification as a fully independent language group. The Jin dialect group is the most often identified as a separate language, but its speakers have the least awareness of it as an independent grouping. The Southwestern group is large and unwieldy, but its status as a group along the old Red Border gives its dialects a uniquely independent outlook - speakers of local dialects through Yunnan, Guaijoe and the Shoung state proclaim pride in their unique tongues, as do the people of the independent-minded Sichuan, and the Southern-philic Hubey. The Jianghuai group has the strongest independent identity - as a midway point between Beijing Mandarin and the Wu language, there is a strong faction of Southern-philic citizens of Huaishu and Huaijiang who would like to emphasise the Wu aspects, and draw away from the North and Russian influence to become closer to the more diverse, liberal South.

The late 20th and early 21st century of Chinese politics has been a dispute between what Westerners would identify as centralists and federalists - but that phase may be coming to an end. The state-level parties making up the Citizens Alliance Party/民聯黨 (Minliendang) have triumphed over the centralised National Party/國家黨 (Gwojiadang) not only in the battlegrounds of Sichuan, Hubey, Huaijiang and Huaishu, but also in Shandong, Gansu and Jinbing, granting the Green Alliance a seemingly insurmountable majority in government. The diversity of China is being seen less and less as a mistake or an obstacle in the way of a return to power, and more as a fundamental trait of the modern China. Just as China is learning to accept its international neutrality and pivot to exploiting its mercantile strength through the trade links built by Japan, it can learn to make its diversity a strength. The connection of these two trends, however, is increasingly being noticed by the die-hard nationalists, and the rise of the Black Star Clique (otherwise known as the Revanchists) bodes ill for the stability of the Chinese government in the depressed and infertile Northern provinces.

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I started this map in about... May, after another drought of ideas for my (still ongoing!) Paris project. But it grew to frustrate me so much - constantly tweaking the romanisation system, deciding what to include and where to put it... but it's out there! In all its multicolour, small-text glory. Who knew the hours I spent procrastinating on exam study by making romanisation systems for East Asian languages would someday come to use...

Description

The nation of China may be united on a map, but it contains such diversity that visitors could be forgiven for thinking it was a vast variety of different countries. From ancient divisions (e.g. the ancient rice-wheat divide), to the modern ones (e.g. the infamous Red Border), each province and city of China has its unique cultural influences.

This map depicts the two nations and one region which use Han languages as a primary language: China, Manchuria and the Formosa (Taiwan) region of Japan.

In the first map, the modern political situation is shown, as well as the vast cities of the region (and neighbouring states). A divide is obvious - the Megalopoleis of the Pearl and Yangtzi river deltas, the evenly spaced cities of the North China Plain, the coast-hugging cities of the Southern coast, the cluster of cities in the Sichuan basin, and the scattering of cities through the relatively rural interior.

Despite the seemingly drastic divide between the busy Yangtzi delta and the spread out North China Plain, this difference mostly stems from the devastation of the Second Civil War and the Oriental War, when rival tank armies battled for control the plains and nuclear weapons were first tested on Chinese military-industrial centres. This wartime devastation began a divergence which, combined with the post-war political tension, a divide in political-economic systems, and the differing dependences on railroads and ports for trade, led to the concentrated development of Southern port cities, while Russian economic dominance led to the concentration of growth in Northern regional railroad centres.

The relative density of the Sichuan basin in the West has always been the case, thanks to its fertile plain, but wartime migration and the relatively looser western border between Russian and French zones certainly helped.

Manchuria's cities feel more natural to the Western eye - a scattering of cities small and large, thanks to ports (Yingkoe and Dairen), railways (Moukdun and Kharbin), resources (Heseiki and Kitsurin), or politics (Changchuen).

The second map depicts the political situation in the immediate aftermath of the Oriental War. During the planning for the rapidly approaching defeat of the Bellist/Futurist/衝者 (Chungje) government, neither the Russian or Japanese governments were willing to agree to give up the foothold they had gained in the world's largest market - not even to the legitimate restored emperor. Despite French pleas to agree to a neutral 'Open China' policy, the final peace treaty established zones of occupation. Russian forces advanced to occupy the lions share of the country north of the Yangtzi; Japan kept Chingdao and gained Nantong and most of China south of the Yangtzi; while France added the leftover portion - Guaijoe and parts of the former Guangshi/Guangdong provinces - to its trade post of "Joeshan and the Argent Isles" and its pre-war protectorates of Yunnan, Hainan and the Shoung state. The restored Imperial Chinese government was left only with Nanjing and its hinterlands, and the "Red Border" stretched from Sichuan to Shanghai.

The legacy of these occupying powers continues to deeply affect the provinces which are heirs of the systems they estabished. Most clearly on the map, Yunnan, Hainan, the Shoung state and Joeshan remain autonomous countries - practically independent in all ways except military, thanks to the French withdrawal conditions with China (and, less openly, Japan, which effectively took France's place throughout its East Asian sphere of influence soon after).

Less obviously, the cultures and economies of North and South have been deeply affected by each occupier - and not just through the uses of Cyrillic and Juyin in writing.

The Russian government, deeply influenced by/interested in/invested in its domestic corporations, decided the best way to cement its influence without infringing on the de jure sovereignty of the Chinese government was to sell the huge amounts of seemingly abandoned productive capital to its own corporations. Paired with the physical embodiment of its influence, the Russian gauge railroads that soon grew like vines southwards to the Yangtzi, the Russian government determinedly made North China an economic vassal of the Russian Empire, consuming Russian imports while selling Russia cheap goods and resources - a completion of what Russia's China policy had sought to achieve for a century.

In contrast, the Japanese occupiers saw how Russia posed a greater military threat than ever before, as well as the opportunity posed by the home-grown resistance networks in Southern China, which had formed in opposition to the Chungje regime's aggressive centralising/modernising/homogenising policies. These resistance groups, mainly organised by old provinces, were allergic to the Futurist ideology they saw reflected in the Russian government's Rationalism (which dominated Western governments at the time), and looked towards the left-wing Japanese government of the day, and its message of Asian solidarity, as a way to protect the traditional cultures they had grown protective of (a passion for traditional culture today seen in the formal Hanfu and Qipao, the popularity of traditional sports, and the vigorous practice of traditional spiritualism). Provincial boundaries were redrawn with the help of a few effortlessly staged referenda, creating new states centred around the various Southern Han languages (which, not coincidentally, put wealthy Japanese-occupied areas along the Red Border into new provinces under complete Japanese influence). These states survive today, along with their local cultures and identities - fiercely proud of their local dialects, and protective of their freedoms from centralised power.

In order to draw a contrast to Russian policies in their battle for Chinese minds, the Japanese drew a leaf from the book of European Distributists, in extolling the virtues of local power and property. The positive legacy of Japanese land reforms were drawn upon by the left-wing government of the day, which distributed Chinese property mostly to local farmers and peasants (although urban industrial capital tended to go to the legal successors of the pre-war Caifa conglomerates, which, not coincidentally, had become heavily tied to Japanese zaibatsu through loans and share ownership). The Southern states operated on constitutions that granted solid rights to citizens, as well as significant autonomy to municipalities. The economic influence of the Japanese, who emphasised naval power and sea trade, is also evident in the size and influence of port cities.

This north-south divide has only increased as China has reunified, and internal migration across the Red Border has opened up - Northern migrants choosing to move to Southern commercial cities has enhanced the economic divide, while causing cultural tensions to rise to new heights despite the first truly independent and united Chinese governments since before the Oriental War.

The third map shows the traditional areas of ethnic and linguistic 'minority' groups. Four distinct types of group are visible.

First, there are the ethnic minorities. In the northwest there are the few Mongols who were not detached to join independent Mongolia after the war, the Tibetans in the border regions which Tibet was forced to give up due to the sheer size of the neighbouring provinces (and the overweening influence of Russia), the Muslim Hui scattered across Northern cities, and various other minor border groups. The southwest features a plethora of Himalayan and other mountain groups - so numerous they justify the existence of the two exceptionally autonomous states of Yunnan and the Shoung state. On the island of Taiwan, a diverse group of Austronesian aborigines live in the mountains, isolated from the tightly packed coastal cities dominated by Japanese-speaking Han people. In Manchuria, state support has ensured the flourishing of the culturally central Manchu people, as well as the Ewenqi, Oroqen, and Daur.

The second group are the migrant communities - the Russians, Joreans and Japanese, none of which have any significant presence outside transient urban communities in China itself. The Russians form a significant presence in the cities and agricultural plains near the Russian border, and along the railway line which cuts through Manchuria past Harbin to Vladivostok. The Japanese are more focused in southern Manchuria, with the exception of the Japanese-developed oil city of Heseiki in the north. The Japanese language has an outsized influence in Manchuria compared to the size of the Japanese ethnic group, thanks to the heavy influence of Japanese media, companies and products across the country. Japanese people are also, obviously, present all across Formosa, though particularly so in the developed coastal plain. Koreans are different to these more urban immigrant groups - Korean migrants arrived in such great numbers through the 19th and 20th centuries that great swathes of eastern Manchuria are primarily Korean-speaking, with Hangul taking pride of place on street signs and advertisements.

The third group make up the Southern Han language groups. As mentioned previously, these dialects form the basis for the post-war new states, and are jealously guarded - the Wu language (based on the Sujoe standard) by Wuyoueh, the Min language(s) by Minyoueh and Chaoshan, the Youe language by Guangnan, the Hakka language by Nanling, the Gan language by Ganpo, and (to a weaker degree) the Shiang language by Shiangchu. The Huey and Pinghua are the closest to Mandarin, some still debating whether they are really just dialects of Mandarin, but speakers of each have strong localist identities, identifying as independent languages within their respective states.

The fourth group are the 'Quasi-Mandarin' groups - groups of dialects which don't quite fit in with Mandarin but aren't different enough to warrant identification as a fully independent language group. The Jin dialect group is the most often identified as a separate language, but its speakers have the least awareness of it as an independent grouping. The Southwestern group is large and unwieldy, but its status as a group along the old Red Border gives its dialects a uniquely independent outlook - speakers of local dialects through Yunnan, Guaijoe and the Shoung state proclaim pride in their unique tongues, as do the people of the independent-minded Sichuan, and the Southern-philic Hubey. The Jianghuai group has the strongest independent identity - as a midway point between Beijing Mandarin and the Wu language, there is a strong faction of Southern-philic citizens of Huaishu and Huaijiang who would like to emphasise the Wu aspects, and draw away from the North and Russian influence to become closer to the more diverse, liberal South.

The late 20th and early 21st century of Chinese politics has been a dispute between what Westerners would identify as centralists and federalists - but that phase may be coming to an end. The state-level parties making up the Citizens Alliance Party/民聯黨 (Minliendang) have triumphed over the centralised National Party/國家黨 (Gwojiadang) not only in the battlegrounds of Sichuan, Hubey, Huaijiang and Huaishu, but also in Shandong, Gansu and Jinbing, granting the Green Alliance a seemingly insurmountable majority in government. The diversity of China is being seen less and less as a mistake or an obstacle in the way of a return to power, and more as a fundamental trait of the modern China. Just as China is learning to accept its international neutrality and pivot to exploiting its mercantile strength through the trade links built by Japan, it can learn to make its diversity a strength. The connection of these two trends, however, is increasingly being noticed by the die-hard nationalists, and the rise of the Black Star Clique (otherwise known as the Revanchists) bodes ill for the stability of the Chinese government in the depressed and infertile Northern provinces.

-

I started this map in about... May, after another drought of ideas for my (still ongoing!) Paris project. But it grew to frustrate me so much - constantly tweaking the romanisation system, deciding what to include and where to put it... but it's out there! In all its multicolour, small-text glory. Who knew the hours I spent procrastinating on exam study by making romanisation systems for East Asian languages would someday come to use...